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VIOLATION REMEDIES: SELF-HELP vs. INJUNCTION – Which to Use?

VIOLATION REMEDIES: SELF-HELP vs. INJUNCTION – Which to Use?

VIOLATION REMEDIES: SELF-HELP vs. INJUNCTION

Which to Use

Imagine this scenario: you are on the board of directors of your association. The association has repeatedly requested that an owner pressure wash their dirty roof to bring it into compliance with the community standards, but the owner refuses to do so. The association has already sent a number of demand letters and even levied a fine and perhaps a suspension of use rights, too, but the owner still will not comply. What is the association’s next step?

  • Is it time to file a lawsuit to compel compliance? Chapters 718 (governing condominiums), 719 (governing cooperatives), a 720 (governing homeowners associations), Florida Statutes, authorize the association to bring an action at law or in equity to enforce the provisions of the declaration against the owner.

OR

  • Is it time for the association to use its “self-help” remedy? In fact, many declarations contain such “self-help” language, which authorizes the association to cure the violation on behalf of an owner and even, at times, assess the owner for the costs of doing so. These “self-help” provisions generally contain permissive language, meaning that the association may, but is not “obligated” to, cure the violation.

Assume that the association’s declaration contains both the permissive “self-help” remedy and the right to seek an injunction from the court that orders the owner to clean their roof or else be in contempt of court. Thus, it would appear the association has a decision to make: (i) go to court to seek the injunction; or (ii) enter onto the owner’s property, pressure clean the roof, and assess the costs to the owner. Not so fast! Recent case law from Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal affirmed a complication to what should be a simple decision, discussed in greater detail below.

In two cases decided 10 years apart, Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal decided that an association did not have the right to seek an injunction to compel an owner to comply with the declaration if the declaration provided the association the authority to engage in “self-help” to remedy the violation. Prior to a discussion of the cases, a brief explanation of legal and equitable remedies is necessary.

There is a general legal principle that, if a claimant has a remedy at law (e.g., the ability to recover money damages under a contract), then it lacks the legal basis to pursue a remedy in equity (e.g., an action for injunctive relief). In the association context, a legal remedy would be to exercise the “self-help” authority granted in the association’s declaration. An equitable remedy would be to bring an action seeking an injunction to compel an owner to take action to comply with the declaration (e.g., compelling the owner to pressure wash their roof). A court will typically only award an equitable remedy when a legal remedy (such as “self-help”) is unavailable, insufficient, or inadequate.

This distinction is first illustrated in Alorda v. Sutton Place Homeowners Association, Inc., 82 So. 3d 1077 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). In Alorda, the owners failed to provide the association with proof of insurance coverage as required by the declaration. The association sent multiple demand letters to the owners, but they failed to comply. The declaration provided, in pertinent part, that “he owner shall furnish proof of such insurance to the Association at the time of purchase of a lot and shall furnish proof of renewal of such insurance on each anniversary date. If the owner fails to provide such insurance the Association may obtain such insurance and shall assess the owner for the cost of the same in accordance with the provisions of this Declaration” (emphasis added). In accordance with the foregoing, the association had the option to purchase the insurance on behalf of the owners and assess them for the costs of same.

However, the association chose instead to file a complaint against the owners seeking the equitable remedy of injunctive relief, asking the court to enter a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the owners to obtain the required insurance coverage. The owners then filed a motion to dismiss the suit arguing that even though they had violated a provision of the declaration, the equitable remedy of an injunction is not available because the association had an adequate remedy at law. In other words, the owners argued that, because the association could have, pursuant to the declaration, undertaken the ”self-help” option by purchasing the required insurance and assessing it against the owners, they had an available legal remedy and, therefore, the equitable remedy sought (a mandatory injunction) was not available to the association. The court, citing to a different case, Shaw v. Tampa Electric Company, 949 So.2d 1006 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), explained that a mandatory injunction is proper only where a clear right has been violated, irreparable harm has been threatened, and there is a lack of an adequate remedy at law. As the association had an adequate remedy at law (the authority to purchase the insurance on behalf of the owners), the third requirement was not met. Therefore, the court held that the association failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case. (This case might be decided differently today as it appears the insurance marketplace will not permit an association to purchase insurance for a unit that it does not own, so the legal remedy presumed available to the association would be inadequate).

Similarly, in the recent case of Mauriello v. The Property Owners Association of Lake Parker Estates, Inc., Case No. 2D21-500 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022), Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal considered the award of attorneys’ fees after the dismissal of the association’s action for an injunction. Ultimately, the court held that the owners were the prevailing party as the association could not seek an injunction because the association had an adequate remedy at law. In Mauriello, the owners failed to maintain their lawn and landscaping in good condition as required by the declaration. As such, the association filed a complaint seeking a mandatory injunction ordering the owners to maintain the lawn and landscaping in a “neat condition.” The association’s declaration contained similar language to the declaration at issue in Alorda. The declaration provided that, if an owner failed to perform any maintenance required by the declaration, the association, after written notice, “may have such work performed, and the cost thereof shall be specifically assessed against such Lot which assessment shall be secured by the lien set forth in Section 9 of this Article VI” (emphasis added). In other words, the association had the permissive “self-help” authority pursuant to the declaration.

The facts of this case were complicated by the sale of the home in the middle of the suit. The new owners voluntarily brought the home into compliance with the declaration, and the case became moot. However, the parties continued to fight over who was entitled to prevailing party attorneys’ fees. The association argued it was entitled to prevailing party attorneys’ fees because the voluntary compliance was only obtained after the association was forced to commence legal action. The owners, citing Alorda, argued that they were entitled to prevailing party attorneys’ fees as the association’s complaint never stated a cause of action in the first place. They argued that the complaint should have been dismissed at the outset because the association sought an equitable remedy (mandatory injunction) when a legal remedy was available to the association (exercise of “self-help” authority).

Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal agreed with the owners that Alorda was controlling. The Court explained that, as in Alorda, “the association’s declaration gave it the option of remedying the alleged violation itself, assessing the owner for the cost, and if the owner failed to pay, placing a lien on the property and foreclosing if it remained unpaid.” As such, the association had an adequate remedy at law and could not seek the equitable remedy of an injunction, which was initially sought by the association. Because the mandatory injunction was not available to the association, the association’s complaint failed to state a proper cause of action and, thus, should have been dismissed by the trial court at the outset. Therefore, the association was not entitled to its sought-after prevailing party attorneys’ fee award, which is otherwise granted if a party comes into compliance after the lawsuit is served.

Sections 718.303 (as to condominiums), 719.303 (as to cooperatives), and 720.305 (as to homeowners associations), Florida Statutes, contain similar language that specifically authorizes the association to bring actions at law or in equity, or both, in the event an owner fails to comply with the governing documents of the association. However, neither the Court in Alorda nor the Court in Mauriello addressed the association’s statutory authority to bring an injunction against an owner who fails to comply with the requirements of the declaration, but rather found that the association must use the “self-help” remedy since it was available to cure the violation.

Notwithstanding the Alorda and Mauriello decisions rendered by Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal, past appellate court decisions from other appellate jurisdictions in Florida have permitted community associations to pursue claims for injunctive relief against violating owners so long as a violation of the restrictive covenant is alleged in the complaint. As such, the Alorda and Mauriello cases appear to be departures from the established principle. Additionally, as both decisions came from Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal, the decisions are certainly binding on those associations within the jurisdiction of the Second District, but there has been no indication that other districts will follow suit. However, there is risk that other appellate district courts may be persuaded by the holdings of Alorda and Mauriello.

As such, if your association’s declaration contains a “self-help” provision, and your association chooses to seek an injunction against an owner rather than pursue “self-help,” the board should definitely discuss the issue in greater detail with the association’s legal counsel prior to proceeding.

The Kaye Bender Rembaum Team Remains Available To You and Your Community Association

 

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Violation Remedies: Self Help vs. Injunction by Jeffrey Rembaum, Esq. of Kaye, Bender, Rembaum

Violation Remedies: Self Help vs. Injunction by Jeffrey Rembaum, Esq. of Kaye, Bender, Rembaum

  • Posted: Jul 14, 2022
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Imagine this scenario: you are on the board of directors of your association. The association has repeatedly requested that an owner pressure wash their dirty roof to bring it into compliance with the community standards, but the owner refuses to do so. The association has already sent a number of demand letters and even levied a fine and perhaps a suspension of use rights, too, but the owner still will not comply. What is the association’s next step?

  • Is it time to file a lawsuit to compel compliance? Chapters 718 (governing condominiums), 719 (governing cooperatives), a 720 (governing homeowners associations), Florida Statutes, authorize the association to bring an action at law or in equity to enforce the provisions of the declaration against the owner.

or

  • Is it time for the association to use its “self-help” remedy? In fact, many declarations contain such “self-help” language, which authorizes the association to cure the violation on behalf of an owner and even, at times, assess the owner for the costs of doing so. These “self-help” provisions generally contain permissive language, meaning that the association may, but is not “obligated” to, cure the violation.

 

Assume that the association’s declaration contains both the permissive “self-help” remedy and the right to seek an injunction from the court that orders the owner to clean their roof or else be in contempt of court. Thus, it would appear the association has a decision to make: (i) go to court to seek the injunction; or (ii) enter onto the owner’s property, pressure clean the roof, and assess the costs to the owner. Not so fast! Recent case law from Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal affirmed a complication to what should be a simple decision, discussed in greater detail below.

In two cases decided 10 years apart, Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal decided that an association did not have the right to seek an injunction to compel an owner to comply with the declaration if the declaration provided the association the authority to engage in “self-help” to remedy the violation. Prior to a discussion of the cases, a brief explanation of legal and equitable remedies is necessary.

There is a general legal principle that, if a claimant has a remedy at law (e.g., the ability to recover money damages under a contract), then it lacks the legal basis to pursue a remedy in equity (e.g., an action for injunctive relief). In the association context, a legal remedy would be to exercise the “self-help” authority granted in the association’s declaration. An equitable remedy would be to bring an action seeking an injunction to compel an owner to take action to comply with the declaration (e.g., compelling the owner to pressure wash their roof). A court will typically only award an equitable remedy when a legal remedy (such as “self-help”) is unavailable, insufficient, or inadequate.

This distinction is first illustrated in Alorda v. Sutton Place Homeowners Association, Inc., 82 So. 3d 1077 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). In Alorda, the owners failed to provide the association with proof of insurance coverage as required by the declaration. The association sent multiple demand letters to the owners, but they failed to comply. The declaration provided, in pertinent part, that “he owner shall furnish proof of such insurance to the Association at the time of purchase of a lot and shall furnish proof of renewal of such insurance on each anniversary date. If the owner fails to provide such insurance the Association may obtain such insurance and shall assess the owner for the cost of the same in accordance with the provisions of this Declaration” (emphasis added). In accordance with the foregoing, the association had the option to purchase the insurance on behalf of the owners and assess them for the costs of same.

However, the association chose instead to file a complaint against the owners seeking the equitable remedy of injunctive relief, asking the court to enter a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the owners to obtain the required insurance coverage. The owners then filed a motion to dismiss the suit arguing that even though they had violated a provision of the declaration, the equitable remedy of an injunction is not available because the association had an adequate remedy at law. In other words, the owners argued that, because the association could have, pursuant to the declaration, undertaken the ”self-help” option by purchasing the required insurance and assessing it against the owners, they had an available legal remedy and, therefore, the equitable remedy sought (a mandatory injunction) was not available to the association. The court, citing to a different case, Shaw v. Tampa Electric Company, 949 So.2d 1006 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), explained that a mandatory injunction is proper only where a clear right has been violated, irreparable harm has been threatened, and there is a lack of an adequate remedy at law. As the association had an adequate remedy at law (the authority to purchase the insurance on behalf of the owners), the third requirement was not met. Therefore, the court held that the association failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case. (This case might be decided differently today as it appears the insurance marketplace will not permit an association to purchase insurance for a unit that it does not own, so the legal remedy presumed available to the association would be inadequate).

Similarly, in the recent case of Mauriello v. The Property Owners Association of Lake Parker Estates, Inc., Case No. 2D21-500 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022), Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal considered the award of attorneys’ fees after the dismissal of the association’s action for an injunction. Ultimately, the court held that the owners were the prevailing party as the association could not seek an injunction because the association had an adequate remedy at law. In Mauriello, the owners failed to maintain their lawn and landscaping in good condition as required by the declaration. As such, the association filed a complaint seeking a mandatory injunction ordering the owners to maintain the lawn and landscaping in a “neat condition.” The association’s declaration contained similar language to the declaration at issue in Alorda. The declaration provided that, if an owner failed to perform any maintenance required by the declaration, the association, after written notice, “may have such work performed, and the cost thereof shall be specifically assessed against such Lot which assessment shall be secured by the lien set forth in Section 9 of this Article VI” (emphasis added). In other words, the association had the permissive “self-help” authority pursuant to the declaration.

The facts of this case were complicated by the sale of the home in the middle of the suit. The new owners voluntarily brought the home into compliance with the declaration, and the case became moot. However, the parties continued to fight over who was entitled to prevailing party attorneys’ fees. The association argued it was entitled to prevailing party attorneys’ fees because the voluntary compliance was only obtained after the association was forced to commence legal action. The owners, citing Alorda, argued that they were entitled to prevailing party attorneys’ fees as the association’s complaint never stated a cause of action in the first place. They argued that the complaint should have been dismissed at the outset because the association sought an equitable remedy (mandatory injunction) when a legal remedy was available to the association (exercise of “self-help” authority).

Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal agreed with the owners that Alorda was controlling. The Court explained that, as in Alorda, “the association’s declaration gave it the option of remedying the alleged violation itself, assessing the owner for the cost, and if the owner failed to pay, placing a lien on the property and foreclosing if it remained unpaid.” As such, the association had an adequate remedy at law and could not seek the equitable remedy of an injunction, which was initially sought by the association. Because the mandatory injunction was not available to the association, the association’s complaint failed to state a proper cause of action and, thus, should have been dismissed by the trial court at the outset. Therefore, the association was not entitled to its sought-after prevailing party attorneys’ fee award, which is otherwise granted if a party comes into compliance after the lawsuit is served.

Sections 718.303 (as to condominiums), 719.303 (as to cooperatives), and 720.305 (as to homeowners associations), Florida Statutes, contain similar language that specifically authorizes the association to bring actions at law or in equity, or both, in the event an owner fails to comply with the governing documents of the association. However, neither the Court in Alorda nor the Court in Mauriello addressed the association’s statutory authority to bring an injunction against an owner who fails to comply with the requirements of the declaration, but rather found that the association must use the “self-help” remedy since it was available to cure the violation.

Notwithstanding the Alorda and Mauriello decisions rendered by Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal, past appellate court decisions from other appellate jurisdictions in Florida have permitted community associations to pursue claims for injunctive relief against violating owners so long as a violation of the restrictive covenant is alleged in the complaint. As such, the Alorda and Mauriello cases appear to be departures from the established principle. Additionally, as both decisions came from Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal, the decisions are certainly binding on those associations within the jurisdiction of the Second District, but there has been no indication that other districts will follow suit. However, there is risk that other appellate district courts may be persuaded by the holdings of Alorda and Mauriello.

As such, if your association’s declaration contains a “self-help” provision, and your association chooses to seek an injunction against an owner rather than pursue “self-help,” the board should definitely discuss the issue in greater detail with the association’s legal counsel prior to proceeding. 

Find out more about KBR Legal – If your community is looking for representation give us a call.

Kaye Bender Rembaum is a full service commercial law firm devoted to the representation of community associations throughout Florida. Under the direction of attorneys Robert L. Kaye, Esq., Michael S. Bender, Esq., and Jeffrey A. Rembaum, Esq. Kaye Bender Rembaum is dedicated to providing clients with an unparalleled level of personalized and professional service regardless of their size and takes into account their individual needs and financial concerns. Most of our attorneys are Board Certified in Condominium and Planned Development Law.

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WHO REPAIRS THE INCIDENTAL DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE ASSOCIATION? Article by KBR Legal

WHO REPAIRS THE INCIDENTAL DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE ASSOCIATION? Article by KBR Legal

  • Posted: Jun 14, 2022
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WHO REPAIRS THE INCIDENTAL DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE ASSOCIATION?

 Imagine: the association has just informed you it is set to begin a massive concrete restoration project. As part of the project, the contractor will need access to the rebar beneath the concrete slab connected to (or in legalese, “appurtenant to”) your unit’s balcony. To access the balcony slab, the contractor will have to remove the custom Italian tiles you just installed on your balcony. Who is responsible for the costs of the removal? Who is responsible to replace the tiles? The answers to these questions will largely depend on whether the governing documents of the association include an “incidental damage clause” and the specific circumstances of the situation, too.

In its most simplistic sense, an incidental damage clause in the declaration means that the association is responsible to repair any “incidental damage” caused by the association’s exercise of its maintenance, repair, and/or replacement responsibility. However, the existence or absence of such language is not always dispositive as to the repair responsibility. This is similar to “i” before “e” unless after “c” as there always seem to be exceptions.

For example, the repair and replacement obligation of the association may be limited only to damage caused to the unit and not cover any owner improvements to limited common elements, such as the balcony; or the obligation may be limited to damage to improvements only as originally installed by the developer, too. Whether the association or the owner will be responsible to repair the damage is highly fact-specific and will depend on the exact language in the governing documents of the association. Arbitration decisions of the Division of Florida Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes (the Division), discussed below, provide some guidance as to when the association may be responsible for incidental damage and when the owners will be responsible to repair same. That said, bear in mind that such decisions are not precedential and in addition only apply to the parties in the arbitration that resulted in the Division’s order. However, it does provide a good understanding of how the Division may rule in a similar circumstance.

As discussed above, where the governing documents contain incidental damage language, and the association damages a portion of the unit while conducting its maintenance, repair, and replacement responsibility, the association is likely responsible for the repair. This is illustrated in Rock v. Point East Three Condominium Corporation, Inc., Arb. Case No. 99-0220, Final Order (September 29, 2000).

In Rock, the association removed a shelf located under a sink and several wall tiles in order to repair rough plumbing in the common elements. The association replaced the wall tiles but did not replace the shelf after the repairs were completed. The unit owner sought, among other things, to have the association replace the shelf. The unit owner also sought to have the association repair tiles in the dining room of the unit which had “popped up” as a result of an unrelated water leak. The association’s declaration of condominium provided that the association was responsible to repair conduits and rough plumbing and provided that “ll incidental damage caused to an apartment by such work shall be promptly repaired by the association.” The arbitrator ordered the association to replace the shelf, holding that the incidental damage to the shelf was caused by the repair to the rough plumbing, which was the association’s duty to maintain. As such, the incidental damage language of the declaration applied to the shelf. However, the arbitrator held the association was not responsible to replace the tiles in the dining room, as the damage to the tiles was not incidental to any work the association performed to repair the rough plumbing.

Therefore, Rock clearly establishes that while an association is responsible to repair portions of the unit that are damaged as a result of the association’s exercise of its maintenance, repair, and replacement obligation, the damage must be incidental to the association’s work.

If the declaration requires the association to repair or replace incidental damage to the unit, the association will likely be responsible to repair and replace owner modifications to the units, too, unless the declaration provides otherwise. In Brickell Town House Association, Inc. v. Del Valle, et al., Arb. Case No. 95-0133 Final Order (September 12, 1995), the association was required to remove certain owner-installed alterations to the unit in order to access and maintain the common elements. The unit owners asserted that the association was responsible to replace the alterations in accordance with the incidental damage provision in the declaration of condominium. The arbitrator agreed, holding that the association was required to reimburse the owners for the expenses required to restore the units to the condition which existed immediately prior to the association’s reconstruction activities, including betterments which were added by the unit owners since the original construction of the units by the developer.

In accordance with the holdings in Brickell and Rock, if the governing documents provide that the association is responsible for incidental damage to the unit, the association will likely be responsible to repair any portions of the unit damaged by the association’s exercise of its maintenance, repair, and replacement responsibility, including alterations made by owners (unless specifically provided for otherwise).

On a different note, if the governing documents of the association contain incidental damage language which is specific to damage caused to units, then the association will not be responsible for incidental damage caused to owner modifications to the common elements or the limited common elements. Similarly, the association will likely not be responsible to repair any damage to any owner alteration to a unit where the declaration required association approval and the owner failed to obtain same prior to installation of the improvement.

In Continental Towers, Inc. v. Nassif, Arb. Case No. 99-0866, Summary Final Order (November 24, 1999), the association needed to conduct concrete restoration, waterproofing, and other repairs to the unit owner balconies. The unit owners had installed tiles on the balcony and argued that the association was responsible for the replacement of the tile because the declaration provided that the association was responsible for incidental damage to the unit. However, the balcony was part of the common elements, not the unit. Therefore, the incidental damage language in the declaration did not apply to the tile, and, absent any other agreement between the parties, the association had no responsibility to repair and replace same. The arbitrator concluded that:

…in the absence of an agreement between the parties or a controlling provision of the documents, ‘it cannot be said from the mere fact of association permission that the association has assumed the perpetual obligation to remove and replace the personal property when necessary to repair and replace the common elements.’ The arbitrator adopts the rationale articulated in the Carriage House case. Since the balcony is a part of the common elements, and the tile was not part of the original construction, the unit owners are responsible for its removal and replacement.

Further, where there are owner modifications which were not approved as required by the declaration, the association will likely not be responsible to repair notwithstanding the incidental damage requirement set out in the declaration. In Harrison v. Land’s End Condominium Association, Inc., Arb. Case No. 94-0298, Final Order (June 27, 1995), the association was required to remove an owner-installed balcony finish in order to effectuate repairs to the balcony slab. In this case, the balcony was considered part of the unit, and the declaration contained a provision requiring the association to repair incidental damage to the unit. The declaration also required the owner to obtain approval of the association before making any alterations to the bal-cony. However, the owner never obtained such approval. Therefore, despite the incidental damage provision, the arbitrator determined that the association was not responsible to replace the balcony finish because the owner did not obtain association approval as required by the declaration.

Therefore, if an alteration requires association approval and an owner fails to obtain such approval, the association will far more likely not be responsible to repair any incidental damage to the alteration notwithstanding the existence of incidental damage language.

Generally, the association’s repair obligation is limited to actual damage caused to the unit as a result of its maintenance, repair, and replacement obligation. If the unit owners are required to vacate their unit in order for the association to effectuate the repairs, the association is not generally responsible to reimburse the owners for the costs of same. However, as the Brickell case, discussed above, shows us, that is not always the case. In Brickell, the owners also argued that the association was responsible to reimburse them for the costs they incurred in vacating the unit for the repairs. In this case, the association chose to proceed with a method of repairing damage to common element pipes from the interior of the units, which required the unit owners in the affected units to vacate. The association did not explore an option in which the repairs could be made from the exterior, which would permit the unit owners to remain in the unit. The arbitrator agreed with the owners and ordered the association to pay for the costs the owners incurred in vacating the units. As you can glean, this case is very fact specific, which led to this outcome.

In an order denying the association’s motion for rehearing, the arbitrator in Brickell, reiterated its earlier decision that the board, within its business judgment, decided to proceed with a method of reconstruction that required the removal of the owners. Therefore, the expenses of those owners are a common expense to be borne by all owners. The important consideration in this case was the fact that the association proceeded with the repairs from the interior without exploring options to proceed from the exterior. The arbitrator notes that the order should not be construed to mean that an association would be responsible for accommodations for all unit owners in the event that the condominium building had to be tented for termites, or if a hurricane rendered the building uninhabitable. In those cases, all owners would be required to vacate the units, and there can be no other decision of the board. Additionally, in Brickell, if there was no way for the association to make the repairs that would allow the owners to remain in unit, the arbitrator’s decision may have been different. How-ever, as the association chose to displace certain unit owners to effectuate the repairs without exploring any other options, the association was responsible for the owners’ costs to vacate.

Finally, even when there is no incidental damage language in the governing documents, the association may be responsible for damage to the units if the association fails to conduct necessary maintenance to the common elements, when the association knows that such maintenance is necessary. In Dibiase v. Beneva Ridge, Arb. Case No. 92-0210, Final Order (January 19, 1994), the association was aware that the common element parking area was consistently flooding into an owner’s unit. The association retained an engineer to conduct a drainage study, and the engineer recommended several remedial measures to address the drainage problem. While the association took some remedial steps, the association did not follow through on the study’s recommendations. The arbitrator concluded that the association was responsible for the owner’s costs to repair the unit caused by the flooding. The arbitrator explained that, while “o association is required to protect the property against a 100-year storm…” the association was responsible to take those steps reasonably necessary to protect the condominium property.

As the association had an expert report that advised if the association did not take certain remedial measures, the damage to the condominium property would continue, the association had an obligation to make the repairs. As the association failed to follow the report, it was responsible for the damage caused to the unit.

In accordance with the decision in Dibiase, if the association receives a report from an expert advising that certain repairs must be performed, and the association fails to take action, the association may be responsible for the costs of any damage to the units caused by its failure to act.

As you have likely gleaned from the foregoing discussion, it can be difficult to determine who is responsible to repair and replace improvements damaged during the association’s exercise of its maintenance, repair, and replacement obligations. Given the complexities of the issue, your association should consult with its legal counsel with any inquiries regarding the association’s responsibility for incidental damage.

Kaye Bender Rembaum

We are dedicated to providing clients with an unparalleled level of personalized and professional service regardless of their size and takes into account their individual needs and financial concerns. Our areas of concentration include

1200 Park Central Boulevard South, Pompano Beach, FL. Tel: 954.928.0680
9121 North Military Trail, Suite 200, Palm Beach Gardens, FL. Tel: 561.241.4462
1211 N. Westshore Boulevard, Suite 409, Tampa, FL. Tel: 813.375.0731
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  • Construction defect claims
  • Contract drafting and negotiation
  • Cooperatives
  • Covenant enforcement
  • Fair Housing
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  • Litigation and Arbitration
  • Master/ Sub Association Issues
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Video: The Whirlwind Condo Safety Legislative Session is Passed: “Now What”?

Video: The Whirlwind Condo Safety Legislative Session is Passed: “Now What”?

  • Posted: Jun 03, 2022
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The Whirlwind Condo Safety Legislative Session is Passed: “Now What”?

Two bills were presented to the Governor and passed: SB 2D –

Property Insurance and SB 4D – Building Safety Learn about how this will affect your associations.

The following (and more) was discussed:

-Mandatory structural inspections, reserve studies and timelines for repairs

-Changes to florida building code concerning roof repairs and replacements

-New rules on deductibles and time limits for filing claims

-What is RAP and will it reduce insurance premiums

-Changes for contractors and AOBs

-Immediate and long term impacts on associations The panel of professionals include:

-Lisa A. Magill, Esq., BCS (Kaye Bender Rembaum)

-Michael York (Socotec)

-Matt Mercier (CBIZ)

-Michael Kornahrens (Advanced Roofing)

-Rafael Aquino (Affinity Management)

 

Florida residential property owners are subject to restrictive covenants on their property, be it by a declaration of condominium or declaration of covenants.

Florida residential property owners are subject to restrictive covenants on their property, be it by a declaration of condominium or declaration of covenants.

  • Posted: May 30, 2022
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Robert L. Kaye, Esq., BCS | Legal Morsels

A large percentage of Florida residential property owners are subject to restrictive covenants on their property, be it by a declaration of condominium or declaration of covenants.  In addition to these restrictions, Florida Statutes contain additional restrictions that apply to these properties, some of which involve use restrictions.  For condominiums, the provisions of the statutes are of a heightened significance because but for the statutes, condominium ownership of property does not exist.  However, for homeowners’ associations, restrictive covenants have been in use for centuries, well in advance of the existence of such statutes.  As a result, certain statutory provisions may not apply to every homeowners’ association in Florida.

There is a restriction within both the U.S. and Florida Constitutions that limit the ability of the state to enact a law that will impair an existing contract or vested contractual right.  Use restrictions contained in declarations of covenants have been identified by Florida courts as existing contracts between the property owner and the entity that operates the community under the governing documents (the association). There is also case law in Florida that addresses whether a change in the statute applies to the community based upon if a particular phrase is included in the governing documents (commonly referred to as Kaufman language).

If the governing documents include  Kaufman language, any changes made by the legislature in a given year will automatically be incorporated into the governing documents and apply to that community.  Conversely, if there is no Kaufman language, only what is referred to as “procedural” changes made by the legislature will apply to that community.  An example of a procedural change would be a change in a notice requirement for elections.  Statutory changes that are “substantive” would not apply in that instance to that community.  An example of a substantive change would be requiring the association to take on all exterior maintenance of the residential dwellings (presuming the documents do not already provide for that obligation).  Without the Kaufman language in the governing documents, this latter statutory change would not apply to that community, as such change would likely be considered unconstitutional.

During the legislative session in 2021, Section 720.306 of the Florida Statutes was amended to add subsection (h), which provides, in pertinent part, that any amendment to a governing document after July 1, 2021 that prohibits or regulates rental agreements applies only to a parcel owner who acquires title to the parcel after the effective date of the amendment or to a parcel owner who consents to the amendment (with specific exceptions relative to short term rentals and limiting rentals to up to 3 times a year).  However, under the analysis discussed above, rental restrictions and the ability to amend governing documents are generally considered substantive vested rights.  As such, this new statute appears to  impair the existing contractual rights of many property owners in homeowner association communities.

The first step in considering whether this new rental restriction change applies to a particular homeowner association community is to check the governing documents for Kaufman language (this also assumes that the documents were not initially created on or after July 1, 2021).  Typically, Kaufman language is not included in original documents by developers of communities, but  many associations have added it by amendment after the developer was no longer involved.  If the Kaufman language is in the documents, the new statutory rental restriction provisions apply.  If, however, there is no Kaufman language, the new rental restriction statute would not be applicable to the community.  In this instance, the membership could still amend the governing documents to prohibit or regulate rentals within the community, which should be enforceable against all current owners, regardless of whether or not they voted in favor of the amendment.

The issue of whether or not this new statutory change regarding rental restrictions violates the Federal and State Constitutions has not been tested in the Florida or Federal courts as of this writing.  Before considering amending the governing document in a homeowner association community to create rental restrictions, it is recommended to consult with the association attorney as to the limitations that may apply.

Kaye Bender Rembaum is a full service commercial law firm dedicated to the representation of community associations throughout Florida.

Kaye Bender Rembaum is a full service commercial law firm dedicated to the representation of community associations throughout Florida.

  • Posted: May 05, 2022
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Kaye Bender Rembaum is a full service commercial law firm dedicated to the representation of community associations throughout Florida. Under the direction of attorneys Robert L. Kaye, Esq., Michael S. Bender, Esq., and Jeffrey A. Rembaum, Esq. Kaye Bender Rembaum provides its clients with an unparalleled level of personalized and professional service regardless of their size and takes into account their individual needs and financial concerns. They have offices in Pompano Beach, Palm Beach Gardens and Tampa, and in Miami-Dade by appointment.

The associates of Kaye Bender Rembaum establish relationships with clients to understand their needs and goals. Kaye Bender Rembaum assists clients in all matters of Association representation including, but not limited to, collection of assessments, contract negotiation, covenant review and amendment, covenant enforcement and construction defect claims. Kaye Bender Rembaum also keeps clients up-to-date on new developments in the law and how they personally affect them. The firm provides prompt, effective, high quality, cost-efficient and understandable legal advice and services to a diverse client base. Associates strive to help clients operate and administer their communities better and to educate them on their responsibilities and duties under Florida law and their governing community documents. Robert Kaye, Michael Bender and Jeffrey Rembaum are industry leaders who are often sought out by public policy makers and the media for advice and commentary on community association law.

The information you obtain at this site is not, nor is it intended to be, legal advice. You should consult an attorney for individual advice regarding your own situation. Thank you for your interest in Kaye Bender Rembaum.

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Kaye Bender Rembaum is dedicated to providing clients with an unparalleled level of personalized and professional service regardless of their size and takes into account their individual needs and financial concerns. Our areas of concentration include:

  • Assessment Collections
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  • Covenant Enforcement
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  • Land Use and Zoning
  • Litigation and Arbitration
  • Master / Sub Association Issues
  • Pre and Post Turnover Planning
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BOARD MEMBER to BOARD MEMBER EMAILS: ARE THEY OFFICIAL RECORDS?

BOARD MEMBER to BOARD MEMBER EMAILS: ARE THEY OFFICIAL RECORDS?

  • Posted: Apr 08, 2022
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BOARD MEMBER to BOARD MEMBER EMAILS: ARE THEY OFFICIAL RECORDS?

On January 6, 2022, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR), through the Division of Florida Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes (Division), entered a Final Order Granting Petition for Declaratory Statement in the matter of In re: Petition for Declaratory Statement, James Hanseman, Petitioner (the Hanesman Declaratory Statement). In this Final Order, the Division Director (Chevonne Christian) stated that all board member to board member emails are official records of the association. Unfortunately, this Order was entered i) without regard to who owns the device from which the email was sent;

ii) without regard to whether the manager was included in the email chain; iii) without regard to whether the email was sent to a minority or majority of board members; and iv) without regard to the board members’ constitutional right of privacy. The decision does not consider the sacrosanct requirement that a quorum of board members is needed to conduct business. If a board member can enter into a conversation with a minority of the board without triggering a required meeting notice, then a board member should also be able to communicate, by any means, with a minority of the board, including email, without it rising to the level of being considered an official record of the association. However, given the scope of the Order, this will likely require an act of the Florida legislature to accomplish.

In general, a petition for declaratory statement may be used to resolve questions or doubts as to how the statutes, rules, or orders may apply to the petitioner’s particular circumstances. These statements are only binding upon the parties who join in the proceeding. The Division issues “declaratory statements” when requested by parties who are unclear about the applicability of portions of the Condominium Act, Chapter 718, Florida Statutes. Declaratory statements are formal written positions taken by the Division on the laws and rules the Division is authorized to enforce and interpret. Importantly, with regard to the Hanesman Declaratory Statement’s precedential value, it has none whatsoever. It only applies to the parties named in the Hanesman Declaratory Statement, which includes the petitioner, Mr. Hanseman, and the Wildewood Springs II-B Condominium Association Inc. This decision is merely persuasive authority, at best. In fact, the Division does not even have to follow their own written precedent. Yet, it is predictive as to how the Division will rule should a similar fact pattern be presented. So, beware!

The Hanesman Declaratory Statement could stand for the broader proposition that all director emails are official records of the association, or perhaps it stands for the narrower proposition that board member emails are not automatically excluded as an official association record merely because the emails were sent from a director’s private email address and privately owned computer. Time will tell, I hope. In the meantime, applying its broadest interpretation means that the Division has now opined that all director-to-director emails are official records. This broad interpretation means such emails must be produced in response to a member’s official records request, unless later excluded from production due to matters of privilege. This broad interpretation also means that for all requests to inspect the official records of the association, directors will have to search their own hard drives and provide copies to the manager or whoever is coordinating the inspection. If this broad interpretation is to be applied, it is yet another burdensome requirement for board members and could be viewed as an extreme overreach of a governmental administrative agency. In light of this possible interpretation and obligation to turn over board member to board member emails, who will want to serve on the board, now?

Let us examine the history of this important topic. On March 6, 2002, Sue Richardson, the Chief Assistant General Counsel of the DBPR, issued an opinion which provided that “ondominium owners do have the right to inspect email correspondences between the board of directors and the property manager as long as the correspondence is related to the operation of the association and does not fall within the…statutorily protected exceptions… regulations expressly requiring archiving emails, but…if the email correspondence relates to the operation of the association property, it is required to be maintained by the association, whether on paper or electronically, under chapter 718, Florida Statutes.”

In Humphrey v. Carriage Park Condominium Association Inc. Arb. Case No. 2008-04-0230 (Final Order, March 30, 2009), the arbitrator of the Division ordered that

“…emails…existing…on the personal computers of individual directors…are not official records of the association…Even if directors communicate among themselves by email strings or chains, about the operation of the association, the status of the electronic communication on their personal computer would not change. Similarly, an email to an individual director or to all directors as a group, addressed only to their personal computers, is not a written communication to the association.”

The arbitrator reasoned that “his must be so because there is no obligation to turn on personal computer with any regularity, or to open and read emails before deleting them.”

Then, on July 1, 2014, the Florida Legislature amended s. 718.112(2)(c) to provide that board members may communicate via email. Just because the legislature clarified that directors may do so does not mean that such email communications should automatically be considered official records of the association. Board members are not publicly elected officials. Yet, the Division’s recent Hanseman Declaratory Statement creates a basis to conclude that the Division desires to hold a director’s email communications to the same standards.

A condominium association is a privately owned entity whose members elect representatives to effectuate the orderly operations of the association. Serving as a board member of a condominium association is not at all akin to holding public office, and in our opinion, board members should not be held to the same standard as that of elected officials. The last thing a community association board member needs is to be micromanaged by one or more cantankerous owners and the vocal minority.

In the Hanesman Declaratory Statement, Ms. Christian takes the position that because §718.111(12)(a), Fla. Stat., provides, in relevant part, that the “official records of the association” include “all of the written records of the association not specifically included in the foregoing which are related to the operation of the association,”

that nothing exempts records when created or transmitted with a board member owned device rather than association owned device.

She then applied what she referred to as the plain meaning of the term “writing,” referring to the definition of the term from Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ED. 2019), which provided “emails constitute a form of writing.”

In fact, had the Florida Legislature intended for emails from one board member to another to be considered official records subject to inspection, then when it amended Chapter 718.112, eff. July 1, 2018, to provide that “members of the board of administration may use email as a means of communication but may not cast a vote on an association matter via email,” the legislature could have clarified that such emails were considered a part of the official records. Obviously, the legislature did not do so. This can only mean that the legislature had no intent whatsoever for a director’s email sent from their personal computer to a minority of other board members to be considered an official record.

What is the end game of the Hanesman Declaratory Statement? The implications are far-reaching, indeed. Does this mean that text messages must be disclosed? What about communications on messaging apps such as WhatsApp and Signal? If not, why not? The logic is arguably the same. What about conversations held with a board member outside of a meeting—must the board member make a disclosure he or she had such conversation at the next noticed meeting? Where does it end?

It is rather common knowledge that there is already a mechanism in the law to acquire documents of every kind. It is called a “subpoena duces tecum” and is used in active litigation to compel production of documents. In this author’s opinion, that is the only circumstance in which a board member’s private emails must be produced, unless and until the Florida Legislature or an appellate court squarely addresses this issue.

As the phrase goes, “one step forward and two steps back.” In other words, while a board member can use email to communicate with a fellow board member, it may come with the steep price of later required disclosure. So, if you want to avoid email disclosure, you may want to consider using a phone to discuss matters. If you want to play it really safe, then be sure to only chat to a minority of board members, too. Until there is an appellate court decision or statutory law that squarely addresses email disclosure, please be sure to discuss these matters with your association’s attorney. In the meantime, perhaps consider using dedicated association-hosted email addresses for association-related emails.
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LAST SURFSIDE-INSPIRED BILL FAILS – A Perfect Opportunity Lost

LAST SURFSIDE-INSPIRED BILL FAILS – A Perfect Opportunity Lost

  • Posted: Mar 24, 2022
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As a result of the 2022 Florida legislative session, there will be no new statutes requiring mandated building/engineering inspections, no statutory changes to budgeting procedures, no mandated reserve study requirements, and no statutory changes to required disclosures.

While only a very few Florida counties have mandated in their code of ordinances that older condominium buildings have life-safety inspections, that does not mean required maintenance and proper planning can be otherwise avoided elsewhere. Board members must exercise their fiduciary duties with due care and due diligence. Voluntary engineering inspections and professional reserve studies should be considered to take place on a regular schedule. Maintenance, repairs, and replacements should be budgeted and funding sources properly identified.

As often explained by Board Certified attorney Lisa Magill, “is the law the only reason you stop at a red light? Probably not. You stop because there’s a likelihood a truck will smash into you from the side.” In other words, common sense should prevail. All condominium unit owners know that one day the roof, air conditioners, and water and cooling towers will need to replaced, the building will need to painted to ensure a water tight seal remains intact, the pool will need re-surfacing, and the parking areas and asphalt will need attention, too. Perhaps one of most expensive repairs, which is rarely discussed, let alone planned for and budgeted in advance, that even the Florida Statutes do not specifically mention it by name, is concrete restoration, which can cost tens of thousands of dollars, and often such repairs cost millions of dollars depending on the extent of the repairs. But, such repairs are a given. It is not a matter of “if” but rather only a matter of “when” these repairs will be required.

The only way to avoid a revolt of the membership when explaining the upcoming multi-million dollar assessment is to lessen the blow by having some, if not all, of the needed monies already saved in a reserve account. Section 718. 112(1)(f)(2)(a) provides that, “n addition to annual operating expenses, the budget must include reserve accounts for capital expenditures and deferred maintenance. These accounts must include, but are not limited to, roof replacement, building painting, and pavement resurfacing, regardless of the amount of deferred maintenance expense or replacement cost, and any other item that has a deferred maintenance expense or replacement cost that exceeds $10,000. The amount to be reserved must be computed using a formula based upon estimated remaining useful life and estimated replacement cost or deferred maintenance expense of each reserve item. The association may adjust replacement reserve assessments annually to take into account any changes in estimates or extension of the useful life of a reserve item caused by deferred maintenance.”

While a majority of the quorum of the membership can vote to waive or reduce reserves, this can only occur if the board of directors provides the membership such opportunity. For example, when voting to reduce reserves the percentage by which the required reserve can be reduced is decided in advance by the board and then presented to the membership for the vote. In light of the Champlain Towers South disaster, boards of directors should put considerable thought into these decisions.

On March 12, Ann Greggis of Florida Politics reported that “the Legislature’s inability to pass any legislation updating condo regulations in the wake of last summer’s disaster that killed 98 people stunned observers…For this Session, nine bills sought to change rules regarding condominium associations…An estimated two million people live in 912,000 Florida condo units that are 30-years or older. Another 131,773 units are 20 to 30 years old, according to the Florida Engineering Society & American Council of Engineering Companies of Florida….The executive director of the engineering society and council called the failure to pass any legislation this year a ‘missed opportunity,’ according to a news release.”

On March 11, Jon Schuppe and Phil Prazan, NBC 6 South Florida reported that, “n the nine months since 98 people died in the collapse of a Surfside, Florida, condominium, state lawmakers have pledged to pass measures that could help avoid a similar disaster.

On Friday, they failed.

Negotiations between the Florida Senate and House of Representatives, both controlled by Republicans, broke down, with the two sides unable to agree on a bill that would require inspections of aging condo buildings and mandate that condo boards conduct studies to determine how much they need to set aside for repairs. The talks were undone by a disagreement over how much flexibility to give condo owners in the funding of those reserves.”

Never has the term “sausage factory” been more appropriate to describe the 2022 team of Florida legislators who failed to pass meaningful legislation that could have helped thwart another Champlain Towers South disaster. But, just because the legislature failed in doing so (for this year), that does not mean, as a board member, that you can fail, too. Make a commitment to your condominium community to plan for the future. Adopt a board resolution, or even amend the condominium declaration, to have required building inspections and reserve studies. In addition, if your association is waiving reserves year after year, stop it and start saving for the future. You will be glad you did.

 

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